Long read: redressing the neglect in India-Brunei relations by Izzuddin, Mustafa
Long read: redressing the neglect in India-Brunei relations
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104119/
Version: Published Version
Online resource:
Izzuddin, Mustafa (2020) Long read: redressing the neglect in India-Brunei 
relations. South Asia @ LSE (15 Jan 2020), 1 - 3. Blog Entry. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Long	Read:	Redressing	the	neglect	in	India-Brunei
Relations
What	could	2020	hold	for	India’s	relations	with	Brunei?	With	bilateral	relations	at	an	historic	low	Mustafa	Izzuddin
(ISAS,	Singapore	&	LSE	Alumnus)	argues	that	a	convergence	of	geopolitical	strategic	goals	could	allow	India	to
expand	its	geo-strategic	footprint	in	Southeast	Asia	while	simultaneously	allowing	the	energy-rich	Brunei	to	continue
to	grow	economically.
In	India’s	eastward	engagement	with	Southeast	Asia	under	Narendra	Modi’s	‘Act	East’	policy,	the	energy-rich
maritime	country	of	Brunei	would	be	expected	to	feature	prominently.	Yet,	during	Modi’s	first	term	in	office	from
2014	to	2019,	India	neglected	Brunei:	Modi	has	not	visited	Brunei,	despite	visiting	several	Association	of	Southeast
Asian	Nations	(ASEAN)	countries,	either	in	a	bilateral	meeting	or	a	multilateral	summit.	Meanwhile,	the	Sultan	of
Brunei,	Hassanal	Bolkiah,	has	visited	India	only	once	to	celebrate	25	years	of	ASEAN-India	dialogue	relations.
Strategic	convergence
Although	bilateral	cooperation	has	been	taking	place	between	India	and	Brunei	since	diplomatic	relations	were
established	in	1984,	the	potential	in	India-Brunei	relations	has	been	unrealised	to	its	fullest.	Should	India	and	Brunei
redress	this	benign	neglect	in	their	bilateral	ties	both	would	mutually	benefit.	Modi’s	re-election	to	a	second	term	in
2019	could	pave	the	way	to	resuscitate	India-Brunei	relations	as	an	integral	plank	of	his	government’s	‘Act	East’
policy	to	expand	India’s	geostrategic	footprint	in	Southeast	Asia.
Engaging	Brunei	is	strategically	significant	to	India	as	it	could	lend	greater	intensity	and	vitality	towards	the
country’s	determined	quest	to	connect	comprehensively	with	Southeast	Asia.	This	would	include	engaging
constructively	with	each	ASEAN	country	on	a	sustained	bilateral	basis.
The	focus	on	maritime	countries	like	Singapore,	Indonesia	and	Malaysia	have	taken	prominence	in	India’s	‘Look
(now	Act)	East’	policy	since	1991.	As	a	result,	Brunei	appears	to	be	relegated	in	importance	and	neglected	by	Delhi
policymakers.	Modi	should	thus	step	up	efforts	to	hoist	India-Brunei	relations	so	that	Brunei	stands	on	a	more	equal
footing	with	its	maritime	partners.
Engaging	India	meets	the	strategic	purpose	of	Brunei’s	practise	of	hedge	diplomacy	–	also	known	as	performing	a
balancing	act	in	its	foreign	policy.	This	is	linked	to	small	state	diplomacy	whereby	small	states	like	Brunei	balance
and	counterbalance	their	foreign	bilateral	relations	in	order	to	remain	secure	and	autonomous,	due	to	the
complexity	of	geopolitics.	Brunei	maintains	close	defence	relations	with	the	UK	and	the	US	while	advancing
economic	ties	with	China	and	its	ASEAN	maritime	neighbours.
That	Brunei	is	looking	as	much	to	the	East	as	it	is	to	the	West	suggests	that	the	country	would	welcome	a	more
constructive	engagement	with	India.	Outside	of	Southeast	Asia	but	within	Asia,	it	is	with	China	that	Brunei’s
relations	have	gradually	intensified	in	recent	years.	But	policymakers	in	Brunei	are	not	keen	to	put	all	their	bilateral
eggs	in	the	Chinese	basket,	given	China’s	assertive	regional	behaviour	in	the	disputed	South	China	Sea	where
Brunei	is	also	a	claimant.	Brunei	would	therefore	be	open	to	engaging	India	as	a	potential	route	to	diversify	its
foreign	policy.
Strategically	speaking,	India	could	envision	Brunei	as	a	gateway	to	Southeast	Asia	and	a	friend	in	ASEAN	–	Brunei
will	be	the	ASEAN	Chairman	in	2021	–	to	redress	the	unfortunate	reality	that	India	has	not	engaged	the	region	as
much	as	China	and	the	United	States.	For	its	part,	Brunei	could	imagine	India	as	a	gateway	to	engaging	the	other
seven	countries	in	South	Asia.
Maritime	engagement	and	defence	cooperation
One	area	for	closer	India-Brunei	cooperation	is	in	the	maritime	domain.	For	much	of	Modi’s	first	term,	Indonesia
was	India’s	preferred	maritime	partner,	but	for	his	second	term,	Modi	may	want	to	also	engage	other	maritime
countries	in	Southeast	Asia.	For	instance,	Brunei	can	provide	the	policymakers	in	Delhi	with	a	palpable	investment
opportunity	to	augment	its	deep-water	Muara	port,	through	which	India	could	stand	to	benefit	geostrategically	and
geoeconomically.
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The	penchant	for	‘port-led	development’	is	a	central	tenet	of	the	Modi-led	India’s	first-ever	policy	for	the	Indian
Ocean	known	as	the	Security	and	Growth	for	All	in	the	Region	(SAGAR).	A	central	plank	of	India’s	‘Act	East’	policy,
SAGAR	is	focused	on	advancing	the	blue	economy	and	maritime	security.	The	idea	of	‘port-led	development’	is	to
strengthen	domestic	maritime	infrastructure	and	bid	aggressively	for	developing	ports,	as	was	the	case	with	the
Indonesian	port	in	Sabang.
Recognising	that	it	has	been	overly	reliant	on	Western	countries	for	its	defence	cooperation	and	military	purchases,
Brunei	has	sought	to	diversify	its	defence	relations	by	courting	Asian	countries	like	India.	After	a	bilateral	defence
pact	was	signed	in	2016,	Brunei	and	India	have	endeavoured	to	enhance	their	defence	cooperation	such	as
conducting	joint	military	exercises,	naval	ship	visits,	cooperation	between	defence	industries,	and	the	exchange	and
training	of	military	officers.
One	area	which	both	countries	can	capitalise	is	Brunei	importing	military	equipment	from	India	if	Delhi’s	defence
industry	is	able	to	manufacture	arms	attractive	enough	for	export	purchases.	Brunei’s	arms	exports	come	primarily
from	Western	countries	as	the	country	restricts	itself	from	purchasing	arms	from	its	maritime	neighbours	in	order	to
remain	on	good	terms	with	each	one	of	them.	Looking	to	India	therefore	to	buy	arms	is	a	plausible	option	for
Bruneian	policymakers.
Another	area	to	boost	India-Brunei	defence	cooperation	is	to	step	up	joint	military	exercises,	as	India	is	keen	to
expand	its	defence	and	security	footprint	in	Southeast	Asia.	For	instance,	India	could	encourage	Brunei	to
participate	in	the	sequel	to	the	maiden	trilateral	naval	exercise	called	SITMEX	–	a	collaboration	with	Singapore	and
Thailand	aimed	at	buttressing	India’s	maritime	links	with	Southeast	Asian	countries	whilst	contributing	to	maritime
security	through	the	use	of	the	Andaman	Sea.	The	trilateral	SITMEX	was	a	pilot	naval	exercise	that	India	plans	to
multilateralise	in	future	by	including	more	countries	from	Southeast	Asia,	Brunei	being	an	‘oven-ready’	option.
While	Brunei	does	not	see	Delhi	as	a	security	guarantor,	its	defence	cooperation	with	India	is	an	important
contributory	factor	towards	the	survival	of	this	monarchical	small	state.	Meanwhile	for	India,	Brunei	could	prove	to
be	a	beneficial	conduit	for	Delhi	policymakers	to	augment	India-Southeast	Asia	defence	relations	against	a	volatile
regional	security	landscape	in	the	Indo-Pacific.
Economic	prospects
For	the	past	couple	of	decades,	Brunei	has	stepped	up	efforts	to	pursue	a	post-oil	economy	in	order	to	reduce	the
country’s	overreliance	on	oil	and	gas	and	be	less	subject	to	volatility	in	the	global	pricing	of	oil	exports.	Economic
diversification–which	is	consonant	with	the	aims	of	Vision	Brunei	2035	to	achieve	progressive	and	sustainable
economic	growth–necessitated	the	Bruneian	government	to	look	studiously	at	developing	other	sectors	of	the
economy	including	by	attracting	foreign	direct	investment	and	boosting	bilateral	trade	with	as	many	countries	as
possible.
Against	this	backdrop	and	that	economic	diplomacy	is	a	central	tenet	of	India’s	‘Act	East’	policy	of	engaging
Southeast	Asia,	there	is	scope	for	increasing	economic	engagement	in	India-Brunei	ties.	Right	now,	India-Brunei
trade,	which	stands	at	US$364.5	million	and	facilitated	in	part	by	the	India-ASEAN	Free	Trade	Area,	is	subpar,	and
investments	in	each	other’s	country	are	miniscule.
Accordingly,	India,	which	boasts	a	fast-growing	trillion-dollar	economy,	could	invest	in	the	sectors	of	Brunei’s	local
economy	that	are	beyond	oil	and	gas.	These	sectors	could	include	information	and	communications	technology
(ICT),	finance	and	manufacturing.	Encouraging	more	Indians	to	visit	Brunei	would	also	help	to	boost	the	local
tourism	market,	including	the	niche	of	eco-tourism,	which	Brunei	has	been	actively	promoting	as	a	tourist	hub	in	the
biodiverse	island	of	Borneo.
Although	not	a	member	of	the	India-led	Bay	of	Bengal	Initiative	for	Multi-Sectoral	Technical	and	Economic
Cooperation	(BIMSTEC),	the	policymakers	in	Delhi	may	want	to	enlarge	its	membership	by	including	more
countries	from	Southeast	Asia	apart	from	the	existing	members,	Thailand	and	Myanmar.	Brunei	could	be	a
beneficiary	in	the	same	way	the	country	could	potentially	gain	from	implementing	cooperative	projects	with	China
under	Beijing’s	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.
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After	pulling	out	of	the	megaregional	free	trade	pact	called	the	RCEP	or	the	Regional	Economic	Comprehensive
Partnership	and	scrapping	a	joint	project	with	Singapore	to	develop	Amaravati	city	in	Andhra	Pradesh	presumably
due	to	domestic	reasons,	the	policymakers	in	Delhi	will	also	have	to	convince	their	Brunei	counterparts	that	India
can	still	be	considered	a	trusted	and	reliable	economic	partner,	in	which	it	would	honour	agreements	and	deliver
outcomes	in	good	time.
India’s	voluminous	export	of	Brunei’s	oil	and	gas	suggests	that	India	sees	Brunei	as	important	to	its	energy	security.
Notwithstanding	the	Chinese	apprehensiveness,	India	and	Brunei	could	jointly	explore	oil	and	gas	deposits	in	the
parts	of	the	South	China	Sea	claimed	by	Brunei.	That	way,	both	India	and	Brunei	stand	to	benefit,	Brunei	then
being	able	to	sell	more	oil	and	gas	to	India.
People-to-people	diplomacy
Along	the	lines	of	Southeast	Asia	being	a	magnet	to	a	large	Indian	diaspora,	Brunei	is	home	to	an	Indian	diaspora
numbering	11,500	in	a	country	of	423,000	people.	Indians	in	Brunei	could	serve	as	a	strategic	asset	to	bring	Brunei
and	India	closer	together	through	business	networks	like	the	Indian	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	cultural
associations	such	as	the	Indian	Association	of	Belait.
Brunei’s	receptiveness	to	India	can	also	be	attributed	to	the	country’s	future	royal	succession.	One	essential	focus
of	the	current	73-year-old	Sultan	of	Brunei	and	his	loyalists	is	to	ensure	that	the	kingdom	remains	intact	when	the
royal	succession	eventually	takes	place.	To	this	effect,	the	kingdom	has	to	ensure	a	continued	stream	of	revenue
from	economic	growth	in	order	to	provide	extensive	social	welfare	for	its	people	such	as	in	education	and
healthcare,	and	in	so	doing,	keeping	them	contented	by	preserving	the	longstanding	social	contract.	In	recent
years,	this	social	compact	between	the	kingdom	and	the	people	has	been	tested	by	economic	grievances	and	youth
restiveness	but	not	to	the	extent	of	tearing	the	country	apart.
The	relations	between	Brunei	and	India	are	on	the	cusp	of	positive	transformation.	The	moment	is	opportune	and
the	atmosphere	is	conducive	for	the	governments	of	both	India	and	Brunei	to	intensify	efforts	towards	making	India-
Brunei	relations	more	significant	in	each	other’s	foreign	policy.	The	political	leaderships	of	Modi	and	the	Sultan	will
be	pivotal	in	redressing	the	benign	neglect	in	India-Brunei	ties,	by	working	towards	taking	this	lackadaisical	bilateral
relationship	to	the	next	level	of	deepened	engagement	on	a	sustainable	basis.	But	while	the	Sultan	has	met	Modi	in
Delhi,	Modi	has	yet	to	make	a	trip	to	Brunei.	Envisioning	the	bilateral	potential	in	India-Brunei	relations	must
therefore	start	with	Modi	prioritising	Brunei	on	his	foreign	travel	schedule	in	2020.
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